Why are young Europeans leaving home so much later than before?
No single cause explains why the average age to move out of parents' house has risen across much of Europe, but weak youth employment and high housing costs are the two factors most consistently linked to late leaving. Eurostat finds that in countries where young people leave home later, such as Greece, Croatia, Spain and Italy, the employment rate for 20-to-29-year-olds is below the EU average of 65.5%, while in early-leaving countries such as Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands it tends to be higher.1
Housing costs compound the pressure. Between 2010 and 2024, rents across the EU rose by 26.7% and house prices by 55.4%, often outpacing income growth, according to Eurofound.2 In Barcelona, Maurici Serra, head of property management company Finques Albalate, says salaries have risen roughly 95% over 30 years while housing prices have risen approximately 470%, leaving a young couple spending around 55% of income on rent compared with about 25% a generation ago.4 Culture and education patterns also play a role: in Mediterranean countries, studying close to home and stronger family ties make staying on more socially accepted, which means the delay is not purely financial.4
What percentage of 30 year olds live with their parents?
Across the EU, around 49% of young adults aged 18 to 34 living in private households still live with their parents, with the highest shares in Southern and Eastern Europe.5 Croatia leads at 76.4%, followed by Slovakia at 70.3%, Poland at 68.3%, Italy at 68.1% and Greece at 67.3%.5 Spain, where the average age to move out is 30.2, has 67.2% of 18-to-34-year-olds at home.5 Portugal, at 62.4%, sits well above the EU norm despite a leaving age of 28.8.5
At the other end, Finland, where the average age of leaving home is 21.3, has just 17.1% of that age group still at home, and Denmark, at 21.8 years average leaving age, has 17.9%.5 Germany stands at 31.2% and Sweden at 23.8%.5 The regional divide reflects both housing market conditions and cultural norms: in Northern and Western Europe, more developed rental markets, social housing and housing allowances make early independence more achievable.5
Who gains and who loses when young adults stay home longer?
When young adults stay home longer, the effects ripple well beyond the family. Laura Ullrich, director of economics at Indeed Hiring Lab, notes that delayed household formation pushes up the average age at which people marry and have children, reduces fertility rates, slows home purchases and affects local school enrollment.3 "When household formation slows, it slows new household formation, which also makes the age where people typically get married go up, the age people have their first child goes up, fertility rates go down," Ullrich told Fortune.3
For parents, extended co-residence can mean sustained financial support well into their children's thirties. A Wells Fargo survey cited by Fortune found that 64% of parents with Gen Z children aged 18 to 28 said their children still rely on them financially, with support concentrated in rent and essential bills.3 For young people themselves, staying home can be financially rational in the short term, but Ullrich warns it may reshape lifetime earnings and migration patterns for years, as young adults who planned to move to cities for first jobs instead stay closer to home during their search.3 EUobserver notes that when a low-income family cannot support a young person's move toward independence, financial dependence can pass from one generation to the next.2
How to afford to move out of your parents house in Europe?
There is no single formula for affording to move out across Europe, but the evidence points to a combination of employment, rental market access and targeted policy support as the main levers. Eurostat's data shows that countries where young people leave home earliest, Finland at 21.3 years, Denmark at 21.8 and Estonia and Lithuania at 22.7, tend to combine higher youth employment rates with more developed rental markets, social housing and housing allowances that reduce the upfront cost of independence.1, 5
For individuals in higher-cost countries, the barriers are steep. In Spain, 28.3% of young adults living with a parent said in 2025 that they could not afford to rent, and the average young couple in Barcelona spends around 55% of income on rent.2, 4 EUobserver identifies the policy responses most likely to help: properly staffed schools that widen opportunity, routes from education into decent work, more affordable and social housing, targeted rent assistance and stronger tenant protections.2 Without those structural changes, the average age to move out of the parental home in southern and eastern Europe is unlikely to fall significantly, since individual saving alone cannot offset a 470% rise in housing prices against a 95% rise in wages over three decades.4
How might housing costs and youth employment shape leaving ages ahead?
Whether leaving ages rise or fall ahead depends largely on how youth employment and housing costs move together. Eurostat's own analysis links the two directly: where youth employment is above the EU average of 65.5% for 20-to-29-year-olds, leaving ages tend to be lower, and where it is below, they tend to be higher.1 EUobserver frames two broad possibilities: if affordable housing expands and youth unemployment falls, more young people could find a credible route from education to independent living; if housing costs keep outpacing wages and joblessness among the young stays elevated, delayed independence could become more entrenched.2
The trend since 2010 offers a mixed signal. Greece's average leaving age has risen 2.6 years and Spain's by 1.8 years since 2010, while Lithuania's has fallen 4.1 years and Latvia's by 2.4 years, suggesting that policy and labour market conditions can move the number in either direction. [CHART FACTS] Ullrich at Indeed Hiring Lab cautions that the broader pattern of delayed household formation is likely to show up for years in migration patterns and lifetime earnings, and that it will structurally alter the economy rather than self-correct quickly.3